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Organizing Online: Union Solicitation on
Employers' E-mail Systems
Cheryl M. Stantont

The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")' grants employees the right to organize labor unions.2 To secure this right,
Congress enacted Section 8(a) of the NLRA, which forbids employer interference in organization efforts.' The Supreme Court
has held that this provision protects employers' and nonemployee
union organizers' ability to disseminate information to targeted
employees.4
As more employees gain access to company electronic mail
systems ("e-mail systems"), employees will increasingly use
employer e-mail systems for union activity.5 Courts will need to
determine what legal boundaries exist for employer restrictions
on organizing by union members on employer e-mail systems.
Thus far, no cases have addressed the ability of employees to
organize in this manner.
The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") has not ruled
on how organizers may use employers' e-mail systems. One
NLRB case, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,' held that employers cannot enact policies exclusively prohibiting union e-mail
messages, but the decision left many questions unanswered. For
example, the administrative law judge in du Pont declined to rule
on whether an employer could ever lawfully prohibit its employees from using its e-mail system to transmit union messages.7
This Comment argues that existing labor law can be applied
to union organizing which utilizes employer e-mail systems,
provided the courts permit flexibility in how employers structure

t
2

B.A. 1994, Williams College; J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Chicago.
29 USC §§ 151-197 (1994).

29 USC § 157 (1994).

3 29 USC § 158(a) (1994).

CentralHardware,Inc. v NLRB, 407 US 539, 542-43 (1972).
Donald H. Seifman and Craig W. Trepanier, Evolution of the Paperless Office:
Legal Issues Arising Out of Technology in the Workplace, 21 Employee Relations L J 5, 23
(1995).
6 311 NLRB 893, 919 (1993).
Id.
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and enact rules prohibiting organizing on e-mail systems. Part I
explores the union organizer's right to disseminate organizational information under the NLRA. Part II discusses how e-mail
differs from existing methods of information dissemination. Part
III outlines how existing labor law should apply to union use of
employer e-mail systems and the e-mail policies employers
should be permitted to enforce.
I. RULES GOVERNING UNION ORGANIZATION
When read together, Sections 7' and 8(a)(1)9 of the NLRA
grant employees the right to organize unions without employer
interference. Section 7 of the NLRA provides: "Employees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations... ,,"This guarantee includes both the union
officials' right to discuss organization with employees and the
employees' right to discuss organization among themselves."
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed . . . " in Section 7.12 This
Comment examines employers' ability to restrict distribution,
solicitation, bulletin board postings, and nonemployee access to
the workplace.,
A. No Distribution and No Solicitation Rules
Despite the employees' right to self-organize, under certain
circumstances a company may enact a no solicitation or no distribution rule prohibiting union soliciting and leafletting.8 Although the employees' freedom to communicate with one another while on the job site is essential to their right to self-organize
and to bargain collectively," an employer may place restrictions

Codified at 29 USC § 157 (1994).
Codified at 29 USC § 158(a) (1994).
10 29 USC § 157.
" Central Hardware Co. v NLRB, 407 US 539, 542-43 (1972); see also Thomas v
Collins, 323 US 516, 533-34 (1945) (stating that "national law" fully and freely grants
employees the right to discuss and be informed about the union choice).
12 29 USC § 158(a)(1).
13 See Republic Aviation Corp. v NLRB, 324 US 793, 797-98; see also Restaurant
Corp. of America v NLRB, 827 F2d 799 (DC Cir 1987); Central Hardware,407 US at 54243 (stating that the effectiveness of Section 7 organizing rights depends on the freedom to
communicate the advantages and the disadvantages of organizing).
" Republic Aviation, 324 US at 803 n 10 (quoting Peyton Packing Co., 49 NLRB 828,
843-44 (1943)).
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on organizing activity when the employer can demonstrate that
such restrictions are necessary to maintain production or discipline.15
1. Enacting no distributionand no solicitation rules.
The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") limits the
activities a no distribution or no solicitation rule may prohibit.
The NLRB balances the employees' right to organize, including
the right to communicate with other employees at the job site,
against the employers' right, to maintain productivity and discipline." The Supreme Court has held that the NLRB may presume that restrictions on employee solicitation during nonworking time and on distribution of literature during nonworking time
in nonworking areas violate Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 17 The
Supreme Court's rationale is that employees may do what they
wish during nonworking time, even when they are on an
employer's premises, provided they do not interfere with the
employer's interest in production and discipline. 8 The employer
may, however, overcome the presumption of unreasonable discrimination if it can prove that special circumstances make prohibiting solicitation during nonworking time essential to maintain production or discipline.'9
In contrast, bans on solicitation during working time in
working areas are presumptively valid.2 ° The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit explained that such rules
may be presumed valid because they prevent solicitation from
interfering with production.2 The Fifth Circuit has held that a
no solicitation rule is permissible "provided that the rule or regulation is promulgated in good faith and bears some reasonable
relation to efficient operation of the plant, and is not merely a
device to obstruct or impede self-organization."22
15

Id.

Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 US 483, 491-92 (1978); Republic Aviation, 324
US at 797-98.
17 Beth IsraelHospital, 437 US at 492; see also Republic Aviation, 324 US at
803-04 n
10.
18 Republic Aviation, 324 US at 803-04 n 10 (quoting with approval NLRB
decision
presuming valid any rule prohibiting solicitation during working time).
9 Id; Beth IsraelHospital, 437 US at 492-93.
20 For example, see NLRB v Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 US 105 (1956) (upholding a

ban when other means of communication off site were available). See also Daylin Inc.,
Discount Division, 198 NLRB 281, 286 (1972).
21 Restaurant Corp. of Am. v NLRB, 827 F2d 799, 805-06 (DC Cir 1987).
Sunnyland Packing Co., 227 NLRB 590, 594 (1976), enfd, 557 F2d 1157 (5th Cir
1977).
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2. Enforcing no distributionand no solicitation rules.
An employer may not use an otherwise valid no solicitation
rule to discriminate against union activity. Although banning
solicitation during working time and in working areas is presumptively valid,2" a facially valid no solicitation rule enforced
in a disparate manner is prohibited." Under Section 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA, employers may not disparately enforce a no solicitation rule against unions: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer, by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment, to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."2 5
Since the no solicitation policy sets forth rules which employees
must follow, it is a condition of employment and cannot be
discriminatorily applied to discourage union organizing.26
The District of Columbia Circuit has held that an employer
may enforce a no solicitation rule against union organizing and
not against other social solicitations when the union solicitation
is substantial, systematic, and concentrated, while the social
solicitation causes only minimal and irregular interference.2 7 In
Restaurant Corp. v NLRB, the defendant employer had a rule
prohibiting "solicitation of any kind."" The employer discharged
two employees who discussed union organizing with other employees during working time in working areas.29 One employee,
Roxie Herbekian, met with approximately ten people;3" the other
employee, Sherwood Dameron, took part in only one on-site meeting with two other employees which lasted less than five minutes.3 During the preceding year the employer failed to discipline six other nonwork-related solicitations, including three instances of money collection for a going-away gift for an assistant
manager, a baby gift for a chef, and a birthday cake for a waiter.32 The Restaurant Corp. Court examined whether "in terms of

23 Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 US at 113.
24 Restaurant Corp., 827 F2d at 804-05.

29 USC § 158(a)(3).

26 RestaurantCorp., 827 F2d at 804-05.
27 Id at 809.
28 The employers' rule stated: 'Solicitation of any kind, including solicitation for

clubs, organizations, political parties, charities, etc. is not permitted on working time or in
customer areas. Distribution of literature of any kind is not permitted on working time or
working areas. Offshift employees are not allowed on the premises." Id at 802.
9 Id at 803.
"0 Restaurant Corp., 827 F2d at 802.
31

Id.

32 Id at 804.
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the actual disruption of the workplace, the [union and social]
solicitations were substantially equivalent."33 The Court, holding

that Herbekian's solicitations interfered with work substantially
more than the unpunished social solicitations, noted:
It is equally obvious that Herbekian's solicitations on
behalf of the union were significantly more involved
than, say, a simple request to chip in for a small gift.
According to Herbekian's testimony, her solicitations
on behalf of the union often involved an explanation of
the comparative merits of the union's dental, hospitalization and legal plans.'
The Restaurant Corp. Court concluded, however, that the
employer disparately enforced its no solicitation rule when it
discharged Dameron after condoning nonunion solicitations that
caused greater disruption in the workplace.35 The Court found
Dameron's single, five-minute solicitation directed at only two
employees "of substantially lesser duration and intrusion" than
the other condoned social solicitations which involved many more
employees. 6
Additionally, employers cannot enact a narrow no union
solicitation rule to avoid the disparate enforcement analysis. As
Judge Bork noted in his dissent in Restaurant Corp., when a no
solicitation rule by its terms prohibits only union solicitation, and
an employer permits nonunion solicitation, the issue is whether
the employer adopted the rule to discriminate against union
activity." Judge Bork explained that review of a no union solicitation rule is the same as the analysis of whether an employer
disparately enforced a no solicitation rule against unions: the
court must determine whether the employer has treated similar
conduct differently."
3. Employers' rights absent a no solicitationrule.
Employers possess certain rights even in the absence of a no
solicitation rule. They can fire employees who interfere with their

'3

'
3

Id at 808.
Restaurant Corp., 827 F2d at 807.
Id.
Id at 809.

37

Id at 812-13 (Bork dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Restaurant Corp., 827 F2d at 811.
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coworkers' productivity.3 9 In NLRB v General Indicator Corp.,4°
the Seventh Circuit held that when an employee leaves his work
station and disrupts the work of other employees during their
working time, even to discuss union business, the employer can
terminate that disruptive employee regardless of whether the
employer has a no solicitation rule.4 ' The NLRA does not protect
disruption of other employees' productivity, even when the disruption involves discussing union business.42 Rather, the employer's interest in maintaining order and productivity in the
workplace outweighs the employee's interest in union organizational activities.43
B.

Limiting Messages on Bulletin Boards

An employer can prohibit employees from placing nonworkrelated notices on its physical bulletin boards. The NLRA does
not provide employees a protectable interest in the use of an
employer's bulletin board." The employees' right to discuss
self-organization, however, extends to placing notices on bulletin
boards when an employer has waived its right of exclusive control over the medium. 41 Once an employer permits employee access to a company board, it can not thereafter remove notices or
discipline or threaten an employee who posts union notices.46
As with no solicitation and no distribution rules, employers
may not disparately enforce their bulletin-board policies. Courts
will not permit employers to preclude employees from posting
union notices unless the company enforces the bulletin-board
rules consistently. 47 For instance, in NLRB v Southwire Co., the

NLRB v General Indicator Corp., 707 F2d 279, 283 (7th Cir 1983).
40

Id at 279.

"' Id at 283.
42

Id at 282.

General Indicator, 707 F2d at 283.
4' Union Carbide Corp. v NLRB, 714 F2d 657, 660 (6th Cir 1983). The court stated
that the provision came from the Labor Management Relations Act, when in fact the rule
is codified in the NLRA. See also, Honeywell, Inc., 262 NLRB 1402 (1982) (holding that it
is an unlawful labor practice for an employer to permit employees to post any nonworkrelated messages except for union messages); NLRB v Southwire Co., 801 F2d 1252, 1256
(11th Cir 1986).
Union Carbide,714 F2d at 660-61.
Id. See also NLRB v Container Corp. of Am., 649 F2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir 1981)
(per curiam) (stating that employer could not discipline union employee who posted an
antimanagement notice on company's bulletin board).
17
Southwire, 801 F2d at 1256-57 (holding that company improperly refused access to
bulletin board where evidence showed company otherwise assented to employee access to
bulletin board and discriminatorily refused to allow posting of union message); NLRB v
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Eleventh Circuit held that a company violated Section 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA when it refused to allow a union to place an organizing notice on a trade board when the company did not uniformly
enforce its bulletin-board rules.4
C. Nonemployee Access to Employers' Property
A nonemployee may not enter an employer's premises to
discuss organizing a union4 9 unless the employees live and work
beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate
with them. ° Mere inconvenience does not warrant nonemployee
access to employers' property.5 1 Courts often find, however,
that "face-to-face contact" is necessary to make an alternative
means of communication reasonable." Once a nonemployee enters the employers' property, the employer is permitted to limit
the nonemployees' access and activity.
1. Prohibitingnonemployee access to property.
Nonemployee organizers cannot enter employers' property to
organize a union. The guarantee contained in Section 7 of the
NLRA "includes both the right of [nonemployee] union. . . [organizers] to discuss organization with employees, and the right of
employees to discuss organization among themselves."53 The
guarantee, however, does not insure that a nonemployee organizer may discuss organization on the employer's property.5 4
Rather, the general rule is that nonemployee organizers
trespass when they enter an employer's property. 5
Nonemployee organizers may enter an employer's property only
under special circumstances. In NLRB v Babcock and Wilcox Co.,
the Supreme Court announced an exception to the general rule
for cases where the locations of the employees' workplace and
living quarters place them beyond the reach of reasonable union
efforts to communicate.56 To gain access to an employer's properChallenge Cook Bros., Inc., 374 F2d 147 (6th Cir 1967); Union Carbide,714 F2d at 660-61.
48 Southwire, 801 F2d at 1256.

4 NLRB v Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 US 105, 112 (1956).
o Id at 112-13; Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB, 502 US 527, 539-40 (1992).
' Lechmere, 502 US at 534.
52 See, for example, National Maritime Union of America AFL-CIO v NLRB, 867 F2d
767, 773-74 (2d Cir 1989).
CentralHardware, 407 US at 542.
Lechmere, 502 US at 534.
Babcock & Wilcox, 351 US at 112.
Id at 112 (holding that employer may validly prohibit nonemployee distribution of
union literature on its property if the union can reach the employees with its message
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ty, the union bears the burden of showing that no other reasonable means of communicating its organizational message to the
employees exist, or that the employer's no access rule discriminates against the union.57
As the Supreme Court explained in Lechmere, Inc. v
NLRB,5 8 the Babcock exception is narrow.5 9 The exception is
designed to protect Section 7 rights "of those employees who, by
virtue of their employment, are isolated from the ordinary flow of
information that characterizes our society." ° The exception,
however, does not apply when nontrespassory access to employees is cumbersome or less than ideally effective:
[Babcock's rule] does not apply wherever
nontrespassory access to employees may be cumbersome
or less-than-ideally effective, but only where "the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees
place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable
union efforts to communicate with them."6 '
Face-to-face contact may be necessary to make an alternative
means of communication reasonable. In NationalMaritime Union
of America v NLRB,6 2 the Second Circuit held that mail and
telephone solicitation were not reasonable means for communicating a union's message because these methods did not involve
"face-to-face" interaction between the union solicitors and the employees. 63 Stating that an "effective organizing campaign" partially
consisted of face-to-face interaction," the court stated, "without
a reasonable opportunity for face-to-face contact, mailings and
telephone calls are inadequate."65

through reasonable alternative efforts, and if the employer's rule does not discriminate
against the union as compared to other types of distribution).
"7 Sears Roebuck & Co. v San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 436 US
180, 205 (1978). See also Babcock & Wilcox, 351 US at 112; Lechmere, 502 US at 539-40.
"
502 US 527 (1992).
69 Id at 539-40.
60 Id at 540.
" Id at 539 (quoting from and adding emphasis to Babcock, 351 US at 113).
62 867 F2d 767 (2d Cir 1989).
0 Id at 773-74.
"

Id at 774.

6 Id at 774.
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2. Regulating nonemployee activity.
Even if nonemployee union organizers are permitted to enter
the employer's property, an employer may restrict nonemployee
activity. In Central Hardware,Inc. v NLRB, the Supreme Court
held that the employers may limit the permitted intrusion to the
minimum necessary for employees to exercise their Section 7
rights.6 6 The Court intended that the Babcock principle only require an employer to "yield" property rights in a way that is
"both temporary and minimal."6 7 Thus, an employer may limit
nonemployee access to (1) union organizers; (2) nonworking areas
of the employer's premises; and (3) the duration of the organizing activity."
II.EMPLOYEES' USE OF COMPUTER NETWORKS TO DISSEMINATE
INFORMATION

Companies and unions increasingly use e-mail as a method
of disseminating work-related information.69 E-mail seems to
resemble placing messages on a conventional bulletin board, but
differs from traditional media because nonwork-related e-mail
messages place a high burden on employers' resources and are
not easily detected.
A. E-Mail Availability at Work
Companies increasingly rely upon e-mail for work-related
communication within the company7 ° and with outside groups'
as an additional means of information dissemination. The Electronic Messaging Association, an advocacy group funded by corporate e-mail users, estimates that sixty million workers correspond via electronic messaging.72 The Association estimates

67

407 US 539, 545 (1972).
Id.

66

Id.

66

Leon Jaroff, Age of the Road Warrior: in the Virtual Office, Paperhas Disappeared
-and So Have Most Employees, Time 38 (March 22, 1995); Suneel Ratan, Snail Mail
Struggles to Survive, Time 40 (Spring (special issue) 1995); Jim McTague, Post Script,
Barron's 27 (December 11, 1995).
70 Gregory L. Miles, At Westinghouse, "E-Mail"Makes the World Go 'Round, Business
Week 110 (Oct 10, 1988).
71 Miles, BusinessWeek at 110 (cited in note 70); Hard Working Home, Inc. 107 (Dec
1, 1995).
72 Andrew Jacobs, Cranking Up the E-Mail: Business, Employees Discover No Holds
Barred Communication, San Diego Union Tribune I1(May 21, 1995).
6
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that Americans on the job send two billion electronic notes each
month.73
Companies point to the advantages of e-mail as a communications tool. One advantage cited is the irrelevancy of
time-companies in the United States can e-mail Asia whenever
they want without worrying about the time change.74 Additionally, e-mail arrives instantly while the traditional first-class mail
can take three days or longer.75 In fact, the Post Office points to
companies' reliance on e-mail as one of the factors causing a 33%
decrease in business-to-business mail since 1988.76
Corporate e-mail permits flexibility for employees as well.
The president of Westinghouse, Paul Lego, relies on e-mail for
continuous access to important information.7 7 This reliance is
possible because over 10,700 Westinghouse employees are connected to e-mail.78
Corporate e-mail, however, has its disadvantages. In a 1995
study, the Gartner Group found that employees spend an average
79
of 50 hours a year using their computers for "no useful end."
Additionally, outside e-mail users can "carpet bomb" a company-a strategy which involves sending e-mail messages to a large
number of employees to gain the company's attention."0
B.

The Uniqueness of Disseminating Information Via E-mail
Although e-mail messages do not physically litter
an employ-

er's property, they can hinder production. Courts permit employers to ban employees from distributing literature in all working
areas at all times s" because such distribution may litter the employer's premises, raising a hazard to production no matter
when the distribution occurred.8 2 As Professor Frank Morris argues, transmitting e-mail also places a burden on the employer:

73 Id.
71 Miles, BusinessWeek at 110 (cited in note 70); Hard Working Home, Inc. 107 (Dec
1, 1995) (cited in note 71).
7' Ratan, Time at 40 (cited in note 69).
76 Id; McTague, Barron's at 27 (cited in note 69).
71 Miles, BusinessWeek at 110 (cited in note 70).
78 Id.
7' Ross Laver, The Games People Play, Macleans 46 (April 1, 1996).
80 John A. Byrne, To Be Young, Gifted and Geeky, Business Week 9 (March 18, 1996).
81 Honeywell, Inc., 262 NLRB 1402 (1982).
82 Frank C. Morris, E-mail Communication: The Next Employment Nightmare, ALIABA Course of Study: Employment Discrimination and Civil Rights Actions in Federal
and State Courts 623, 634-35 (1995).
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E-mail impinges on the rights of the employers even
more so than [literature] distribution, because E-mail
uses employers' hardware, time and resources and
constantly interferes with work functions. Furthermore,
permitting non-work related information to pass
through E-mail slows down the entire e-mail [sic] system.83
Additionally, monitoring e-mail messages is more difficult
and time consuming than monitoring solicitation, distribution, or
bulletin boards. Employers are less aware of the contents of employee e-mail communication. E-mail messages pass through the
computer systems without providing the employers an opportunity to read the messages except through formal monitoring. Employers present at the workplace can casually observe literature
distribution or can periodically read bulletin board notices. Employers cannot, however, keep themselves informed of all employee-transmitted e-mail messages simply by being present at the
workplace. The employer must instead develop an elaborate monitoring system to ascertain which topics employees are discussing
in e-mail messages.
C.

Current Labor Law for E-mail Systems

In a case addressing a union's right to use employer's email, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.," the NLRB found that
the employer's e-mail restrictions were discriminatory and a
violation of federal labor law. In du Pont, an Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ") found that the defendant company had
discriminatorily restricted the union from using the employer's
e-mail system. The company had a rule prohibiting its employees
from using the company's e-mail system to distribute union literature.8 5 The company, however, permitted the employees to use
the e-mail system to distribute literature on all other topics.8"
The ALJ found the rule to be discriminatory because the prohibition targeted only union messages and not all nonwork-related
matters.87 The ALJ, however, declined to rule on whether the
union would have otherwise been entitled to use the e-mail sys-

Id at 636-37.
311 NLRB 893 (1993).
Id at 919.
86 Id.

87 Id.
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tem to contact employees if the employer prohibited all nonworkrelated material." The NLRB upheld the AL's finding."9
III. TOWARD A BETTER FRAMEWORK
Employer no solicitation and no distribution rules should
apply to company e-mail systems, or alternatively, company email systems should be analogized to employer bulletin boards.
Regardless of whether the no solicitation rule or the bulletinboard model applies, the legal rules should permit employers to
prohibit all nonwork-related e-mail messages on their e-mail
systems. Under either model, however, the employer must uniformly enforce the prohibition against all nonwork-related messages, or a court is likely to find that the employer disparately
applied the policy against union activity.
On the other hand, consistently disciplining all nonworkrelated e-mail messages requires employers to carefully review
every e-mail message transmitted, placing high monitoring costs
on the employer. This Comment offers a solution which balances
the unions' right to equal treatment against employers' production rights. Finally, the Comment argues that the ability for
nonemployee union organizers to use company e-mail systems to
organize should be treated as a violation of the company's property rights that is not allowed absent extenuating circumstances.
A. Employer Prohibition of Nonwork-Related Messages
No distribution and no solicitation rules should apply to
employers' e-mail systems. This would allow employers to prohibit any e-mail solicitation or distribution not related to work. °
Alternatively, if courts decline to extend no solicitation and no
distribution rules to e-mail systems, -they should apply the bulletin board model to employer e-mail systems." Even under the
bulletin board analogy, employers would be able to prohibit employees from sending nonwork-related e-mail messages.2 Under
either theory, however, the courts will likely follow E.I. du Pont

" See du Pont, 311 NLRB at 919.
'
'o

Id at 898.
See notes 13-45 and accompanying text.

9' See notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
9
Union CarbideCorp. v NLRB, 714 F2d 657, 660 (6th Cir 1983). See also Honeywell,
Inc., 262 NLRB 1402 (1982) (holding that it is an unlawful labor practice for an employer
to prohibit union related messages exclusively).
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de Nemours & Co.9 3 in precluding the employer from exclusively

prohibiting union e-mail messages. Thus, if employers wish to
discipline workers who transmit union e-mail messages, they
must discipline all workers who send nonwork-related e-mail
messages, resulting in a high monitoring burden on the employer.
1. Limiting nonwork-relatede-mail messages.
As Donald Seifman and Craig Trepanier argue, under the
NLRA employers should be permitted to enact no distribution
policies which prohibit distributing e-mail messages not related
to work.94 Nonwork-related e-mail messages interfere with employee productivity because they burden firm resources and disrupt the employees' work.
Employers should be able to prohibit e-mail messages because transmitting e-mail messages not related to work interferes with productivity. Frank Morris argues that employee messages sent through an employer's e-mail system create a high
burden on company resources because such messages use the
company's computer hardware slowing the computer and cluttering its memory.9" Morris further argues that since transmitting
e-mail creates a higher burden than distributing literature, employers should be able to regulate how employees transmit e-mail
messages in the same way employers regulate how employees
distribute literature.96
Additionally, no solicitation and no distribution rules could
apply to employer e-mail because e-mail organizing cannot be
confined to nonworking time. The NLRB presumes that rules
prohibiting solicitation and distribution during working time and
in working areas are valid.97 The NLRB is likely to permit employers to prohibit the transmission of e-mail messages during
working times in working areas. Although employee organizers
will send the organizing e-mail messages during nonworking
hours, neither employers nor employees can guarantee that the

3 311 NLRB 893 (1993).
Donald H. Seifman and Craig W. Trepanier, Evolution of the Paperless Office:
Legal Issues Arising Out of Technology in the Workplace, 21 Employee Relations L J 5, 23
(1995).
"5 Frank C. Morris, E-mail Communication: The Next Employment Nightmare, ALL
ABA Course of Study: Employment Discrimination and Civil Rights Actions in Federal
and State Courts 623, 636-37 (1995) (cited in note 82).
' Id at 637.
17
NLRB v Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 351 US 105 (1956).
'4
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messages will be read during nonworking hours. Rather, employees will receive the organizing e-mail message either when turning on the computer to begin work or while working at their
computers. Taking time to read and consider these messages will
negatively affect the employer's productivity.
Additionally, employees will always receive e-mail messages
in working areas. Employees can never organize in nonworking
areas while using employers' e-mail systems since the computers
are at employee workstations. As a result, organizing activity on
an employer's e-mail system is likely to disrupt employees during
work time and thereby impair production. This is similar to Morris's argument that although literature distribution occurs during nonworking times, a resulting hazard to production can still
arise.98
Additionally, no distribution and no solicitation rules could
extend to employees who log onto their employer's e-mail system
from home. If employees read e-mail from home for businessrelated messages, the home becomes a working area and thus is
covered by the e-mail policy prhibiting personal use. Also, the
employees arguably enter the workplace when logging into the
employer's e-mail system from home.
Additionally, employees could be denied access to their employer's e-mail system from home to check for personal messages. This use of the e-mail system would violate a prohibition
against all nonwork-related e-mail messages. Although logging
onto the e-mail system during nonwork time in nonwork areas
for personal messages would not hinder the productivity of the
employee reading the e-mail messages, such a use burdens the
employer's computer system.9
NLRB v General Indicator Corp.1

held that employers

may, without a no solicitation or no distribution policy, discipline
employees who disrupt their coworkers by discussing union business.10 1 "[C]ase law holds that an employee who disrupts other
employees during working hours is not engaged in a protected
activity even though he is discussing union business. ' An employer may thus discharge an employee who disrupts other em-

Morris, ALI-ABA Course of Study at 635 (cited in note 82).
See id at 636-37 (arguing that e-mail uses employers' time and resources and constantly interferes with work functions).
707 F2d 279 (7th Cir 1983).
101 Id at 283.
102 Id at 282.
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ployees' productivity with an organizing e-mail message. 103 As
General Indicator suggests, the employers' interest in maintaining order and productivity outweighs the employees' interest in
using e-mail to interfere with other employees at work.
Should courts treat e-mail like conventional bulletin boards,
an employer can only prohibit e-mail messages as long as the
employer has not relinquished control of the e-mail system."'
As with bulletin boards, the courts may determine that the
NLRA does not provide employees with a protected interest in
the use of an employers' e-mail system.0 5 An employer, however, waives its exclusive control of the e-mail medium when it
permits employees to use the e-mail system for some other
nonwork-related e-mail messages. °6 Once an employer permits
employees to use e-mail systems for nonwork-related messages,
the employer cannot prevent an employee from transmitting a
personal e-mail message, especially an organizing message. 107
2. Enforcing bans on nonwork-related e-mail messages.
Existing case law suggests that the employer must enforce
the policy against all nonwork-related e-mail messages, or courts
are likely to find that the employer evidenced a discriminatory
intent. Existing law requires that no solicitation rules and bulletin-board policies not discriminate against unions.0 8 Employers
will also need to enforce e-mail policies prohibiting personal use
against all nonwork-related e-mail messages, not just organizational e-mail messages. As Judge Bork's analysis in Restaurant
Corp. of America v NLRB"° suggests, employers cannot treat
union e-mail messages differently from similar, personal e-mail
messages. " '
Also, the du Pont"' decision suggests that an e-mail policy
prohibiting personal use must be uniformly enforced. Some ambiguity remains since du Pont did not have a policy prohibiting all
nonwork-related e-mail messages and thus the ALJ did not ad-

103 Id at 281.
'o
100

See notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
See note 46 and accompanying text.

See note 47 and accompanying text.
note 48 and accompanying text.
100 See NLRB v Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 US 105 (1956).
'o
827 F2d 799, 805 (DC Cir 1987).
10 Restaurant Corp. of Am. v NLRB, 827 F2d 799, 811 (DC Cir 1987) (Bork concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
. E.I. du Pont de Nenours & Co., 311 NLRB 893 (1993).
"c

017See
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dress the enforcement issue."' In du Pont, however, the ALJ
reasoned that the employer must permit the union's transmission of notices via the employer's e-mail systems
since the em1 13
messages.
of
types
other
all
ployer permitted
Monitoring e-mail is more burdensome to the employer than
monitoring solicitations, distributions, or bulletin-board notices.
Applying either the no solicitation rules or the bulletin board
analogy to e-mail systems will place a high monitoring burden on
the employer. An employer, or an employee reporting to an employer, is more likely to overhear an oral solicitation for union
organizing than to read an organizing e-mail message not sent to
him or her. Similarly, an employer is more likely to observe literature being distributed than a personal e-mail message being
transmitted in the same system as work-related e-mail unless
the employer monitors the e-mail system.
Likewise, employers' monitoring costs will be higher for
enforcing e-mail policies than bulletin board policies. E-mail is
not as public as bulletin boards, making it more likely that more
personal messages will remain undetected on the e-mail system
than on the bulletin board. The only solution is a comprehensive
monitoring system.
A sophisticated detection program might alleviate some monitoring costs. A detection program could monitor all employee
transmitted e-mail to check for personal messages. Such a program, however, would have to be very sophisticated in order to
distinguish personal from work-related issues. Additionally, the
employer could not design the program to detect only union or
organizing messages. Finally, the detection program must review
the entire document, not just the subject line of the e-mail message. If the detection program did not review the text of the message, the organizer could create an innocuous subject description
to disguise the true organizational message.
The controversial nature and importance of organization
increase the likelihood that the employer will learn about the
organizing e-mail messages. Since organizing messages are more
controversial than baby shower invitations, employees are likely
to discuss organizing messages more often and longer than shower invitations. An employer or supervisor will thus be more likely
to hear the employees discuss organizational messages that they
have received than other messages. Also, since union organiza-

11
113

311 NLRB at 919.

Id.
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tion has a greater impact than does a shower on the employer's
business and the employees' lives, employees would be more
likely to discuss the controversial messages.
B.

Solutions to the Enforcement Problems

Possible solutions to the enforcement policy are: (1) to permit
random monitoring, and (2) to permit rules prohibiting mass emailings. Courts should permit employers to monitor for
nonwork-related e-mail messages randomly instead of requiring
employers to monitor all e-mail. When an employer uses a random monitoring system, the NLRB could compare the relative
frequency of union e-mail messages for which employees are
disciplined to that of other nonwork-related e-mail messages
which are detected.
A less effective alternative would be to permit employers to
prohibit, and to monitor, all nonwork-related mass e-mailings."' This alternative still has high monitoring costs and may
be less effective since the employee organizers could simply avoid
sending the organizational message through the monitored mass
mailings. In either case, the employer, recognizing that employees increasingly rely on e-mail to communicate with coworkers
about many nonwork-related topics, should create an intranet or
an electronic bulletin board for all nonwork-related notices, including messages for union organization.
1. Random monitoring.
Courts should permit employers to monitor their e-mail systems randomly. Employers could randomly monitor messages and
systematically discipline all detected nonwork e-mail messages.
When the employer discovers, either from a random check or
from an employee's report of a violation, an e-mail for union
organizing, the employer could discipline the employee for violating a rule against personal use.
As in Restaurant Corp. of America v NLRB," 5 courts will
need to compare the number of union messages that are disciplined with the number of nonunion personal messages similarly
disciplined.'
In Restaurant Corp., the court examined how

By "mass e-mailing" I refer to the process of sending one message to a large
number of (if not all) employee e-mail addresses at once.
5 827 F2d 799 (DC Cir 1987).
116 Id at 812 (Bork concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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much the union solicitations interfered with production.117 Under the random monitoring system courts would compare the
extent to which disciplined union e-mail messages interfered with
production to the amount of interference caused by other personal e-mail messages which the employer detected from a random
search or from an employee report. Courts thus would not presumptively find an employer disparately applying an e-mail policy against personal use simply because the employer has not
disciplined an employee for sending a nonunion-related personal
e-mail that the employer did not detect. The court's comparison
will require employers to record what messages are detected as
well as those messages which result in an employee being disciplined.
2. Prohibitingmass e-mailings.
A less attractive alternative to the universal prohibition of
nonwork e-mail messages is that the employer might prohibit
mass nonwork e-mailings, such as shower announcements or
group "thank-yous." The employer would be required to monitor
only the large e-mail transmissions.
This alternative involves as many monitoring costs as a
universal prohibition on personal e-mail messages and would
likely be less effective. One difficulty with this alternative is that
employers would have to determine what constitutes a mass emailing. If employers have discretion in defining what constitutes
a "mass mailing," the courts may continue to find that employers
are using the rule to discriminate against unions. On the other
hand, if the minimum number of e-mail messages is fixed, then
employees could send mailings in a number slightly less than the
minimum to avoid detection. For instance, the employer may define a mass e-mailing to involve transmitting one message to ten
employees' mail boxes. To avoid detection, the sender can transmit the message ten times to nine employees' mail boxes each
time, rather than to all ninety employee mail boxes at once.
Another difficulty is that the mass e-mailing rule would still
require an employer to monitor all mass e-mailings. While monitoring only mass e-mailings would be a less arduous task than
monitoring all e-mail messages, it would still involve high monitoring costs because the technology needed to monitor mass emailings is the same as is needed to monitor a single message.

...Id at 807.
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The burden is reduced only to the extent that the monitoring
occurs less frequently.
3. Intranets or bulletin boards for personal messages.

The employer might also create an intranet 1 . site or electronic bulletin board for all nonwork-related messages. Employers should recognize that employees will increasingly want,
and in some cases need, to communicate with other employees
about many nonwork issues. To decrease the use of e-mail for
personal messages, the employer might permit employees to use
an intranet site as an alternative forum for nonwork messages.
With an intranet, the employer could require the employees to
confine nonwork messages to one area which employees could
access only during nonworking time. Thus, employees' productivity would not be jeopardized but employees would still be able
to communicate with one another about nonwork matters.
Once an employer permits a nonwork intranet, it must allow
employees to place organizing messages on the electronic board.
As with bulletin board policies, an intranet policy that excluded
only electronic union notices would be discriminatory under Section 8(a)(3)."'
C.

Nonemployee Access to Employers' E-Mail Systems
As a general rule, employers should be able to prohibit

nonemployee access to an e-mail system.120 Exceptions will

arise when nonemployees are unable to reach employees through
On the other
other reasonable means of communication.'
hand, access to e-mail is less justified than entry to premises because unlike entry, e-mail affords no face-to-face interaction."'
Finally, nonemployees transmitting messages on employers' email systems should be subject to the same 23restrictions as
nonemployees who enter on employer's property.1

An intranet is closely related to the internet, except that it is a network which
exists only within firms and between branch offices, fenced off from the outside Internet.
The intranet is actually a Web site where employees can create a Web page to disseminate information. See Enter the Internet, The Economist 64, 65 (Jan 13, 1996); Kenan
Pollack, Gold Rush in Cyberspace, US News and World Report 7274 (Nov 13, 1995).
9 See note 50 and accompanying text.
'2
See notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
121 See notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
2 See notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
123 See notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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Employers will be able to prohibit nonemployees from using
employer e-mail in the same way they can restrict access to their
property.12 4 Under the current standard, for nonemployee entry
onto employer property, 2 5 nonemployee organizers will be unable to use employer e-mail unless they prove they are unable to
reach employees via reasonable alternative efforts.
Professor Allen Hammond suggests that courts should analogize nonemployee access of e-mail systems to employer property. 2 In his article Professor Hammond argues that the
standard applied to nonemployee entry to employers' property
for union organization should be extended to employer e-mail
systems.'2 7 The employer thus has the "right to bar union access [to the employer's e-mail systems] absent a showing that
the union possesses no other reasonable means of communicating
its organizational message to employers." 28
When applying this standard, however, courts will need to
decide whether it is more reasonable to grant nonemployee access
to employer property or to employer e-mail systems for union
organization. Since the same standard would apply both for gaining access to employer property and for gaining access to employer e-mail systems, the issue of which is more reasonable-permitting the nonemployee to enter property or permitting the organizers to use e-mail systems-will probably arise.
Courts will likely find that, as with mailings and telephone
calls, e-mail messages are inadequate for organizing because they
do not afford a face-to-face interaction.'2 9 Union organizers
sending e-mail messages may appear to be more reasonable than
union organizers entering employers' property since e-mail messages are not as physically intrusive. The courts' language, however, suggests that nonemployee access to the employers' e-mail
is an unreasonable alternative. 3 ° In National Maritime Union

See notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
See notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
126 Allen S. Hammond, PrivateNetworks, Public Speech: ConstitutionalSpeech Dimen124
15

sions of Access to PrivateNetworks, 55 U Pitt L Rev 1085 (1994).
127
128

Id at 1103.
Id.

129 See National Maritime Union of America v NLRB, 867 F2d 767, 773-74 (2d Cir

1989) (emphasizing the benefits of face-to-face interactions as a justification for requiring
employers to allow nonemployee organizers to have access to work premises when no
other opportunity for face-to-face interaction exists).
0 NLRB v Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 351 US 105 (1956); Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB, 502
US 527 (1992); National Maritime Union of America AFL-CIO v NLRB, 867 F2d 767 (2d
Cir 1989).
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of America v NLRB, the Second Circuit reasoned that the benefits of face-to-face interaction with employees justified permitting
nonemployee union organizers to enter employers' property
absent other reasonable means of communicating with employees.31 E-mail messages, especially the mass e-mailings which
union organizers are likely to use, do not provide the face-to-face
interaction that courts appear to value so highly.
Also, simply because e-mail is less cumbersome and more
effective to organize does not make it the most reasonable alternative. A union organizer's strongest reason for seeking access
to an employer e-mail system is convenience. E-mail permits the
organizer to reach many workers in a matter of seconds. Courts,
however, have made it clear that ideal effectiveness is not a factor when considering whether or not to allow nonemployee organizers to enter employers' property. 132 The Babcock exception
"does not apply wherever nontrespassory access to employers
may be cumbersome or less-than-ideally effective." l3 These factors should not differ for access to e-mail systems.
In addition, nonemployee union organizers cannot guarantee
that they will fulfill the restrictions set forth in Central Hardware."M Just as Professor Hammond suggests that the same
standards are necessary to gain access both to employer premises
and to employer e-mail,'35 the same restrictions on
nonemployee activity should apply. The courts should require
nonemployee union organizers to adhere to the same restrictions
while using e-mail systems as they would when entering the employers' premises. An organizer's e-mail message would thus be
limited to (1) union organizing, (2) nonworking areas, and (3) the
3
duration of the organizing activity.

As described above,

however, organizers cannot guarantee that employees will receive
e-mail messages in nonworking areas.
CONCLUSION
A union's access to employer electronic mail systems is the
next battle in the labor-management struggle. As unions begin to

' National Maritime Union of America,
132 Lechmere, 502 US at 539-40.
'3
1

Id at 539.

867 F2d at 767 (2nd Cir 1989).

Central HardwareCo. v NLRB, 407 US 539 (1972).
Hammond, 55 U Pitt L Rev at 1103 (cited in note 126).
131 See notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
'37See notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
135
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organize on employer e-mail systems, the courts will be forced to
provide legal rules for this activity.
Existing law can guide the courts on this issue. Employer no
solicitation and no distribution rules should apply to all nonwork
messages transmitted over employer e-mail systems including email messages aimed at union organization. Organizers transmit
messages to employees in working areas, but more importantly,
employees generally read them during working times. E-mail
messages disrupt employee productivity, and thus an employer
may be justified in banning such messages. On the other hand,
courts may analogize e-mail systems to bulletin boards, permitting employers to enact a policy prohibiting employees from placing notices. Under either model, however, the courts will require
that the policy be uniformly applied to all nonwork e-mail messages and not disparately enforced against union organization
messages.
Courts must find solutions to the enforcement problem. One
solution is to permit employers to monitor employees' e-mail
messages randomly for nonunion e-mail messages. Subsequently,
when a court evaluates whether an employer discriminatorily
enforced the e-mail policy prohibiting personal use with only union messages, the court should examine whether the employer
failed to discipline other detected nonwork messages. The court
should not examine whether any nonwork e-mail messages escaped punishment. Alternatively, the employer should be permitted to enact a rule prohibiting nonwork mass e-mailings. This
alternative, however, is problematic because monitoring costs
would still be high and violations would be frequent. Finally,
employers could create intranets to provide a medium for employees to communicate nonwork material. Employers would then
need to permit employees to place union organizing notices on
these intranets.
Last, nonemployee union organizers should not be permitted
to send organizing messages over the employers' e-mail unless
the union has no other reasonable method to reach the workers.
This standard must be more stringent than the standard used for
permitting nonemployee union organizers onto the employers'
property for practical as well as policy reasons.

